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Abstract

Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) play an important role in the Social Security
Administration (SSA) as they hear appeals from individuals who have been denied
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. As a result, the decisions of these
judges have important effects on both individual welfare and government finances,
especially given that the SSDI trust fund is expected to go bankrupt within the next few
years. This paper examines how disability dispositions, decisions, and award rates by
ALJs in the SSA vary according to factors such as gender, tenure with the SSA, age,
general experience in the legal profession, and salary. The data, which span the years
2005-2011, are obtained from the SSA’s Office of Disability and Adjudication Review
(ODAR), which publicly reports statistics such as the number of appeals heard and the
percentage of favorable decisions by each judge, along with internet searches to obtain
information on the personal attributes of the judges. Understanding the factors
affecting the decisions of these judges could be useful for identifying fruitful avenues
for the SSA to control spending through this program, and more generally could
provide insight on how the attributes of highly educated professional workers affect
their work output.
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Introduction
The Social Security Administration (SSA) is a federal program responsible for
providing disability benefits to individuals that qualify. The SSA provides several
programs in which an individual can receive disability benefits. These programs
include Title II, which is covered or insured employment, and Title XVI, which
covers individuals with limited income or resources.1 The Administration uses
Medical Experts (ME’s) and Vocational Experts (VE’s) to provide evidence at
hearings conducted by Administration Law Judges (ALJ).2 The process for applying,
and potentially qualifying, for disability benefits is a four level administration
review process. If an individual applies, and it is determined by an ALJ that the
applicant does not, or no longer, qualifies for benefits, he or she has right to request
a review of the decision. Under that review, which is called a “reconsideration
determination,” a different ALJ, who had no part in the original decision, will review
the request and make a determination on whether or not the individual qualifies.3 If
the individual is again denied, they have the right to a hearing before an ALJ.
Annually, more than “1,300 ALJs render over 700,000 decisions at the hearing
level.”4 If the applicant disagrees with the decision made at the hearing level, they

1
2

3

Social Security Administration. “Medical and Vocational Experts.”
Social Security Administration. “Medical and Vocational Experts.”
Social Security Administration. “What You Need to Know to Request a Hearing Before an

Administrative Law Judge.”
4 Social Security Administration. “Information about the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
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have the right to file an appeal with the Appeals Council as long as it’s filed within 60
days. The Appeals Council will either issue a decision, or defer to the case back to an
ALJ for further review. The Appeals Council listens to over 165, 000 hearing
decisions appealed by claimants each year.5 If the applicant disagrees with the
Appeal Council’s determination, the last option for a claimant is to file suit in a
federal court. If this route is pursued by the claimant, the Appeals Council collects
and transfers all of the relevant case information to a federal court. The SSA
processes over 16,000 cases appealed to federal courts each year.6
The Social Security Administration disability benefit program has become
under increased media and congressional scrutiny in recent years. The unusually
high award rates of ALJs have created a number of concerns, and have largely been
ignored, or not addressed, by lawmakers. In fact, the funds dedicated to this
program are expected to be completely insolvent by 2016, and, as a result, about
nine million Americans currently receiving benefits would see their checks reduced
by 21 percent.7 Originally, the program only provided benefits to individuals with
“debilitating conditions,” such as a heart attack or stroke.8 In 1980, the Reagan
Administration significantly lowered the amount of federal funds dedicated to this
program, which a inspired major backlash among thousands of Americans
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negatively impacted by the decision. As a result, Congress expanded the amount of
qualifying conditions, such as depression and back pain, acceptable under the
program.9 This transformed the application process into one of in which review was
required to determine whether or not the claimant would qualify. The recent influx
of claimants to the disability program has created a massive backlog of cases, which
has overwhelmed the ALJs working for the SSA.10 As of 2012, the backload of cases
stood at 1.4 million.11 Similarly, in 2012, the program came at a cost of $132 billion
to American taxpayers, which is “more than the annual budgets of the Departments
of Agriculture, Homeland Security, Commerce, Labor, the Interior, and Justice
combined.”12 For all the aforementioned reasons, the decisions of these ALJs can
have massive welfare and equity implications for millions of Americans.
While a number of experts, in various fields, have looked into the potential
influences affecting the decisions of judges, nobody has examined influences of
Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Administration. Taratoot, (2014)
examined the influences potentially affecting Administrative Law Judges in the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); however, the variables in his study were
different than those that will be examined by this paper. Taratoot (2014) examined
the affect of personal policy preferences, hierarchical controls by higher courts,
separation of powers influences, and case and defendant characteristics. He found
statistically significant evidence that EPA ALJs are influenced by personal policy
preferences, hierarchical controls, litigant characteristics, and case characteristics.
Faler, Brian. “Federal Disability Insurance Near Collapse”
Faler, Brian. “Federal Disability Insurance Near Collapse”
11 Faler, Brian. “Federal Disability Insurance Near Collapse”
12 Faler, Brian. “Federal Disability Insurance Near Collapse”
9
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While the area of focus of his study, namely ALJs, is similar to that of this study, the
variables are drastically different; other literature into the potential influences of
judge’s decisions has looked at differing types of judges, but examined similar
independent variables. Collins and Moyer (2008) found that gender and race alone
did not have a statistically significant impact on case outcomes; however, when
examined together, they found that the combination did in fact have an effect. More
specifically, they found that minority female judges were more likely to support
criminal defendants than their counterparts on the bench. Peresie (2005) found that
Federal Appellate female judges, in gender coded cases, such as sexual
discrimination and harassment, were inclined to decide a certain way, as well as
influence votes of male judges serving on a bench with at least one female. In regard
to the former, she found that females were more likely to support the plaintiff. In
regard to the latter, she found that the presence of at least one female judge on a
panel increased the likelihood that the male judges on the panel would rule in favor
of the plaintiff. Baker (2008) examined whether raising the salary of the federal
judiciary would have a impact on the quality judges attracted to the bench. He
concluded that raising judicial salaries would not have a significant impact on the
overall quality of the Federal Judiciary. He also found that changing judicial salary
would not have an impact on voting patterns, citation practices, the time it takes to
render a decision, or opinion quality. Choi, Gulati, and Posner, (2009) like the
former study, examined whether higher judicial salaries would have in impact on
the quality of the Federal Judiciary. They concluded that increasing judicial salaries
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is not likely to increase productivity or independence, although it may have an effect
on opinion quality, but if so only a small one.
This topic of this study differs from those mentioned above in that it focuses
strictly on Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Administration. It uses
panel data to examine how an Administrative Law Judge’s, in the Social Security
Administration (SSA), dispositions, decisions, and award rates vary according to
age, salary, tenure with the SSA, gender, experience in the legal profession. The data,
which ranges from 2005 to 2011, is collected from Social Security Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review (ODAR), which publicly reports on every individual ALJ as
well as on aggregate data of a given office that houses multiple ALJs. ODAR provides
data on the total amount of dispositions, decisions, allowances, denials and fully
favorable or partially favorable decisions by judge and year. The award rate, which
is one of dependent variables in this study, is calculated by dividing the number of
fully and partially favorable decisions by the total number of decisions. The
background characteristics of judges, which will be used as the independent
variables, are obtained through Internet searches with the exception of gender
(inferred by the name of the judge or through internet searches); these variables
include age, legal experience (time since passing the bar), tenure with the SSA (time
since starting with the SSA), and salary. In order to determine whether or not these
characteristics have an effect on the total amount of dispositions, decisions, and
award rates, this study utilizes linear regression analysis incorporating both
ordinary least squares and fixed effects. We find that all of the independent
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variables, with the exception of age, have an effect on dispositions, decisions, and
award rate.

Literature Review:
While no research has yet been conducted on Administrative Law Judges in
the Social Security Administration, Taratoot (2014) examined several factors that
may affect judicial decision making of Administrative Law Judges at the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However, the variables examined are
different than those that will be examined in this study. In addition, the data was
collected at the case level; where as the data in this study is aggregated across cases.
Nonetheless, the results of this study focused on Administrative Law Judges, and
thus, are relevant and worth mentioning, even if superficially. Like Administrative
Law Judges in the Social Security Administration, these judges make a once and for
all decision either in favor of the respondent or EPA. Taratoot (2014) examined the
affect of personal policy preferences, hierarchical controls by higher courts,
separation of powers influences, and case and defendant characteristics. The data
was collected from the EPA website and ranges from 1992 to 2008, in which there
were 238 decisions; the dependent variable, “was the size of the civil penalty, in
dollars, issued by the ALJ against the respondent.” (Taratoot, p.124) Further,
because this variable is continuous, he used least squares regression (p. 128)
Tararoot (2014) found that EPA Administrative Law Judges are “influenced by their
political attitudes, maintain partial, but not total, independence from political
constraints, are subject to hierarchical constraints from the EAB and the Supreme
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Court, and, to a limited degree respondent and case characteristics.” (p.130) Lastly,
Tataroot (2014) argued that understanding the influence of these judges is crucial
given the indirect, but significant impact their decisions have on the economy. In
sum, Taratoot (2014) found statistically significant evidence that EPA ALJs are
influenced by personal policy preferences, hierarchical controls, litigant
characteristics, and case characteristics.
Other studies have focused on judges in other types of law, such as federal
appellate judges in criminal cases, but examine similar variables, and thus are worth
mentioning. In their examination of the different characteristics potentially affecting
the decisions of judges on the federal appellate bench, Collins and Moyer (2008)
suggested that the focus of any empirical study into the decision inputs of judges
should focus on the intersection of multiple characteristic rather than focus on a
single characteristic. (Collins and Moyer, p, 219) Collins and Moyer (2008) focused
their study on the “intersectionality” of gender and race. Ultimately, they concluded,
“minority female judges are more likely to support criminal defendant claims when
compared to their colleagues on the bench.” (p. 219)
Collins and Moyer (2008) noted that since 1970, the number of female
minority judges has steadily risen, but according to studies conducted thus far, there
is little evidence to suggest that the increase in female minority judges has led to any
significant impact on the decisions being rendered (p. 219). This is not because the
increase in diversity hasn’t had an effect on the decisions rendered, but rather
because the studies in the past have focused on analyzing the relationship between
an individual characteristic and the decision rendered; Collins and Moyer (2008)
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suggested that a judge is influenced by “a host of personal traits that collectively
affect their behavior (p.219)” As a result, the tests conducted in this study examined
whether gender and race together affect judicial decision making, as opposed to
gender or race alone (p. 219).
Collins and Moyer (2008) inferred that existing literature on the effect of
gender seems to suggest that it may affect the outcome of cases, but “only in limited
cases.” (p.220) Similarly, the empirical data on the effect of race in relation to the
decisions by federal judges has been contradictory, and thus, Collins and Moyer
(2008) suggested that it cannot conclusively accepted that race alone has an effect
on judicial decisions. (p.220) The authors pointed to a study of President Carter’s
circuit court appointees, which found that African Americans were more likely to
support liberal outcomes in criminal appeals cases. (p.220) However, other studies
found that there is no significant relationship between race and judicial decisions.
(p.220) So, the contradictions and inconsistencies in the existing literature on
individual characteristics and judicial outcomes were cited as motivation behind
Collin’s and Moyer’s (2008) study of two independent variables, gender and race,
tested together in relation to judicial decision making. (p. 220) Collins and Moyer
(2008) write, “It is important to take into account the unique experience of being
both female and a member of a racial minority when attempting to discern the
impact of demographic factors on judicial behavior.” (p.220)
While the “intersectionality” of gender and race is a subject that had
generally been unexplored, Collins and Moyer (2008) indicated there had been a
number of notable studies. They referred to Miller, Rossi, and Simpson (1986),
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which found that there was a difference between minority females and members of
other demographics when it came to deciding appropriate punishment for crimes.
(p. 220) More specifically, white men and women tended to focus on the degree of
the crime in relation to the punishment, while black women seemed to focus more
on the individual characteristic, and mitigating circumstances, of the offender. (p.
221) Additionally, it was found that the two groups differed in terms of the extent,
or degree, to which the offender would be punished.
Collin and Moyer (2008) differed from those studies in that they, “empirically
test whether group membership of federal appellate court judges has a discernable
effect on their voting behavior.” (p. 222) Their study focused only on criminal cases
decided between 1977 and 2001 and included data on votes in individual cases with
6,219 total observations, which included 348 judges. (p. 222) The dependent
variables in the study were coded as “liberal” (pro-defendant) or “conservative.”
(pro-prosecution). The independent variables were gender and race, tested
separately, and included in the regression race and gender together. (p. 222) When
testing gender and race together they employed a cohort analysis using “caucasian
males,” “caucasian females,” “minority males,” and “minority females.” (p. 222) It is
important to note that the sample size of minority females was very small due to the
fact that six only minority female judges served during 1977 and 2001. In addition,
they also controlled for variables that may skew the results, such as political
ideology, birthplace, age, decisions of the lower court, institutional norms, the
changing social norms of different time periods, and the percentage of liberally
decided Supreme Court cases dealing with social issues. (p. 223) The authors
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utilized binary logistic regression models in their analysis. In addition, they also
conducted a logit analysis, which included dummy variables for race and gender.
They found that that minority judges were no more likely than their counterparts to
support the defendant’s position. (p. 223) Similarly, they found no statistically
significant relationship between gender and judicial outcome; however, the authors
found race and gender together had a statistically significant effect on judicial
decision making (p. 223) Thus, they concluded that there is, in fact, a relationship
between the “intersectionality” of race and gender and judicial decisions of federal
appellate judges in criminal cases. They write,
“Holding all other variables at their means, the model predicts that minority
female judges will support the criminal defendant’s position in 25.91 percent
of the cases. White-male judges were predicted to support a liberal outcome
in 19.01 percent of their cases, white-female judges in 17.52 percent, and
minority-male judges in 16.15 percent. Thus, female-minority judges were
approximately between6 to 10 percent more likely to support a liberal
outcome than males or Caucasian females.” (p. 224)
Other studies on judicial decision-making have focused on judicial influences
in more gender coded cases, such as sexual discrimination and harassment. Peresie
(2005) provided “data to illuminate whether and how the presence of female judges
in three-judge appellate panels affect collegial decision making in a subset of gender
coded cases – those involving sex discrimination in violating of Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964” (Peresie, 1761) Peresie (2005), like Collins and Moyer (2008),
suggested that past literature into the subject of the relationship between gender
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and judicial preferences had largely been contradictory. In addition, Peresie (2005)
also suggested some of the past studies used a small sample size of female judges,
which may have had an effect on the results. (p. 1764) This problem manifested
itself in Collins and Moyer (2008) in that they only utilized six female judges in
testing their hypothesis. In addition, past studies have focused on a broad range of
issues in which gender most likely played a less significant role than her area of
concentration, Title VII cases. Peresie (2005) also argued that past data on the
indirect effect of female judges on their male counterparts had been contradictory
and flawed for a variety of reasons. (p. 1765) Perhaps the most relevant is that the
studies did not control for significant doctrinal change. As a result, her study used a
limited time frame in which there were no significant changes in the Supreme Court
or federal statutes, and included control variables such as, past career, age, federal
appellate experience, and political ideology. (p. 1766)
Her data was collected from “both published and unpublished decisions on
all sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases decided by the federal court
appeals between 1999 and 2001 where the plaintiff’s cause of action fell under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (p. 1767) The data, which consisted of 556 total
cases and 1666 decisions, examined the probability of a pro-plaintiff ruling in which
a female judge was on the appellate bench. (p 1767) Of the total cases examined,
Peresie (2005) found that the plaintiff lost in 38 percent of the cases in which a
female judge was on the panel. However, she also found that the plaintiff won in 62
percent of the cases in which a female judge was on the panel. (p. 1768) Lastly, in
cases where there was a mixed gender panel of judges, the dissent rate, which was
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roughly 6 percent, indicated, according to Peresie (2005), that male judges were
more likely to agree with their female counterpart. (p. 1768) In addition, she also
examined the decisions of individual judges on the panel within the data set. She
found that female judges ruled for the plaintiff, at 39%, more often than male judges,
at 24%. (p. 1768)
In compiling her data, Peresie (2005) used the judge’s decision on individual
cases (“1” indicates a pro-plaintiff ruling; “0” indicates a ruling against the plaintiff)
as the dependent variable; she incorporated two independent variables tested
separately. (p 1771) The first independent variable was the gender of the judge; the
second independent variable, used to test whether the presence of a female has a
significant effect on male counterparts, was the presence of a female judge on the
three-judge panel, which takes Collins and Moyer (2008) one step further. The latter
is less relevant to this study as ALJs do not make rulings on a panel bench consisting
of multiple judges, but rather are the sole decider of disability cases. She also
included a large variety of control variables including ideology, race, prior
employment, federal appellate experience, age, decision of the lower court, gender
of the plaintiff, and whether the plaintiff was a government entity. (p. 1771) Similar
to Collins and Moyer (2008), she found that race alone had no statistically
significant impact on the judge’s decision. When controlling for age and federal
appellate experience, which were tested separately, she found no statistically effect.
This result is somewhat surprising due to the fact that, as Peresie (2005) noted,
“increasing seniority on the federal appellate bench may cause hardening of the
bureaucratic judicial arteries.” (p.1775)

16

Peresie (2005) found that “in Title VII sexual harassment and sex
discrimination cases, a judge’s gender and gender composition of the panel
mattered to a judge’s decision.” (p. 1776) More specifically, she found that both male
and female judges were generally inclined to rule against the plaintiff. However,
males were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the defendant than their
female colleagues. (p. 1776) Peresie (2005) also found that male judges were more
likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff when one or more females were on the panel.
(p.1778) Peresie (2005) offered four explanations for the statistically significant
relationship between gender and judicial voting, which were deliberation,
deference, logrolling, and moderation. The deliberation theory suggests that the
presence of a female judge in the back and forth deliberation may influence the
decision in favor on the plaintiff. (p. 1771) This theory is based on the assumption
that a judges main motivation in deciding a case is getting the law right, and, as a
result, they are willing to listen to the differing and dissenting opinions of their
colleagues. The theory of deference suggests that males are more willing to defer to
female judges when it comes to deciding gender-coded cases, especially in cases
where the female judge has been subjected to sexual discrimination or harassment.
(p. 1783) It is important to note, as Peresie (2005) did, that females may not actually
be more knowledgeable when it comes to gender-coded cases, but rather males may
view them as such. (p. 1783) The logrolling hypothesis suggests that male judges
side with female judges in gender-coded cases in the hopes that the female judge
will side with them in future cases. (p. 1785) As Peresie (2005) noted, this may
especially be the case when males believe that their female colleagues have strong
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opinions in gender-coded cases. (p. 1785) The theory of moderation suggests that
male judges may moderate, or even suppress, their general anti-plaintiff inclinations
when female judges are on the panel, especially in gender-coded cases. This is based
on the assumption that males may believe siding against the plaintiff in the cases
may potentially make them appear bias or sexist. (p. 1786)
In sum, Peresie (2005) found that the presence of female judges, specifically
in gender coded cases, had an effect both on the outcome of the case and on the
voting of male judges on the panel.
Other studies into judicial decision-making have examined the effect of salary
on judicial performance; perhaps the two most relevant being Baker (2008) and
Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2009). Both studies were conducted after the release of a
report on the federal judiciary by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Roberts,
which suggested that low judicial salaries are likely to have a devastating impact on
the judicial system in the United States.
Baker (2008) analyzed the difference in pay between the private and public
sectors of the legal system and whether we should pay federal circuit judges more.
Generally, he said that federal judges are displeased with the wages they are
currently receiving. Baker (2008) suggested that there are three main arguments
these judges, and others, use in support of higher pay for federal judges. First, some
argue that declining real salaries being given to federal judges will cause them to the
leave the bench, which would create a transaction cost in the form of finding a new
judge, introducing him to the system, and thus, temporarily increasing the workload
of other judges while the seat is vacant. (Baker, p. 70) In addition, judges planning
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on leaving the bench for job prospects in the private sector may be unwilling to rule
against potential future employers. However, Baker (2008) disproves this
argument; he argues,
“This argument assumes that the declining-inflation adjusted judicial salaries
leads to higher turnover. Yet this does not appear to be the case. Albert Yoon
examined the retirement decisions of all district court and federal circuit
judges between 1945 and 2000 and found that tenure trends among the
federal have held fairly constant over the past half century, notwithstanding
the cyclical decline in inflation-adjusted salaries.” (p. 72)
Second, if judicial salaries remain where they are, then few private sector
lawyers will be attracted to the public sector. This argument assumes, as Baker aptly
suggested, that attracting private sector lawyers will be beneficial the judiciary. (p.
72)
Baker (2008) found that, “holding constant the net cost of taking a judgeship,
lawyers who come directly from the private practice perform similarly to
those coming from government jobs other judgeships, or academia across a
range of judicial performance measures.” (p. 72)
The final argument for an increase in the salary of federal judges is that
higher salaries lead to higher quality judges. (p. 72) This is based on the argument,
known as the “salary matters theory”, that higher wages attract higher quality
workers. (p. 73) Baker argued that raising federal judicial salaries attracts judges
that are more concerned with monetary benefits. As a result, judges concerned with
the administrative justice, rather than pecuniary benefits, may be weeded out.
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(p.74) Also, Baker (2008) offers the substitution theory to disprove the idea that
raising wages will have an effect on the selection of federal judges. (p. 75) He argued
that deepening the selection pool, through increased wages, to include candidates
more concerned with salary would not be effective because the executive branch
already knows who they will select, and if that person declines because of salary
concerns, the pool is filled with other candidates that are near perfect substitutes.
(p. 75) In other words, “even if low salaries reduce the number of candidates willing
to take the circuit judgeship, that reduction might be inconsequential.” (p. 75) In
order to analyze these theories Baker (2008) examined whether judicial pay affects
judicial performance. Furthermore, Baker (2008) said if it were found that pay does
not have an effect performance, validity would be added to the substitution theory.
On the contrary, if it is found that pay does affect performance, validity will be
added to the salary matters theory. (p. 76) However, as he noted, it is difficult to
compare judges being paid different salaries because all federal judges receive
roughly the same salary.
As a result, Baker (2008) analyzed the federal pay of judges with the
foregone wage in the next best opportunity in different regions on the country.
Baker (2008) collected data from 1974 to 2004 on the present value of foregone
wages in the form of law firm salaries in the region compared to the accepted
present value federal judicial wage at the time of confirmation, which he called the
“direct comparison approach.” (p. 77) The judicial wage at the time of confirmation
was deducted from the foregone wage in the private sector, which provided the net
cost. (p. 78)
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The three hypothesis Baker (2008) offered, before running regressions are
as follows: (1) “paying circuit judges more creates a less ideological judiciary;” (2)
“paying circuit judges more creates a harder working judiciary;” (3), “paying circuit
judges more creates a judiciary less concerned with its own influence.” (p. 85) To
test the three hypotheses, he used a regression model to estimate the coefficients of
the amount of money a judge gave up to take the bench in relation to the measure of
judicial performance. (p. 85)
To measure judicial ideology, Baker (2008) looked at two variables, partisan
voting in controversial cases and citations. In reference to the latter, he looked at
how often a judge cited an outside opinion, or precedent, due to the fact that judges
have full discretion in determining when, and how often, they will cite. (p.85) This is
based on the assumption that partisan judges don’t typically cite opinions of judges
of an opposing political party. The data consisted of 4958 decisions and 14,874
individual judicial votes, and, controled other factors that may influence a judge’s
decision, namely, “the politics behind the judicial nomination process.” (p. 86) The
dependent variable was the probability that the judge casts a liberal vote in a
controversial case, while the independent variable incorporated an ideology score
of the confirmation process. (p. 88)
In regard to this first hypothesis, Baker (2008) concluded from his results
that raising judicial salary would not have an impact on voting patterns in
controversial cases. Similarly, he found no statistically significant evidence that low
judicial salaries result in a more ideological judiciary. (p. 89)
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In regard to hypothesis two, Baker (2008) used proxies, namely the dissent
rate in controversial cases and the amount of time it takes to deliver a decision after
an oral argument is heard, as a means of quantifying the work effort of a particular
judge. (p. 98) He said, dissent serves as an appropriate proxy for work ethic because
it takes significantly more time to draft and compile a dissent in comparison to
joining a majority opinion. (p.98) In addition, Baker (2008) accurately suggested, a
judge with a lackluster work ethic will write fewer dissents because “he bears the
cost of dissenting, while the benefits flow to others.” (p. 99) Accordingly, the
dependent variable for this hypothesis was the probability a judge writes a dissent
in a controversial case, while the independent variables were the same as the
hypothesis (1). (p. 99) In addition, Baker controlled for the difference in caseload
across different circuits. (p. 99) Interestingly, and in perhaps relevant to subject
examined by this paper, is the theory, suggested by Baker (200), that high caseload
may make a judge more likely to dissent simply because he or she does not have
enough time to work through the details of the case. (p. 99) In other words, the
judge may be inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiff to reduce the time spent on the
case and, as a result, decrease his caseload. Baker (2008) found the relationship,
between salary and dissent rates, to be significant, but only slight. (p. 101) In regard
to his second proxy for the work effort of judges, Baker (2008) used the speed of
disposition after hearing an oral argument as the dependent variable, with the same
previous independent variables, while controlling for whether the majority opinion
faced a concurring opinion or dissent. (p. 105) The results were not statistically
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significant, which suggested that low judicial salaries do not have an effect on the
speed of disposition. (p. 105)
In his third hypothesis, Baker (2008) tested whether a relationship exists
between judicial salary and concern for judicial influence. (p. 105) The salary
matters theory, according to Baker (2008), suggests that judges who accept lower
salaries will be more concerned with the quality and influence of the opinions they
draft. (p. 106) Baker (2008) tested both the total influence (raw number of citations
to a judges opinion) and average influence (number of citations per opinion) neither
of which were statistically significant indicating that a potential raise in judicial
salaries would not have a significant impact on the quality of opinions. (p. 109)
The main conclusion of Bakers study was that there exists no relationship
between financial sacrifice and judicial outcomes; therefore, any policy proposal to
raise judicial salaries cannot be justified. (p. 112) As Baker (2008) states, “Lower
pay does not impact voting patterns, citation practices, the speed of decisions
rendered in controversial cases, or opinion quality.” (p. 112)
Choi, Gulati & Posner (2009) also examined the impact of judicial salaries on
judicial performance. The authors suggested that the widely accepted economic
assumption that all workers seek to maximize wealth might not apply to judges as
they could certainly earn more money in the private sector. Furthermore, they
argued that many judges are attracted to the position for pecuniary benefits, which
include, but are not limited to, ability to influence policy, leisure seekers, status
seekers, and judges who derive utility from serving justice. (Choi, Gulati & Posner, p.
52) Accordingly, the authors argued that a potential pay increase would incentivize
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judges to work harder only when there is risk of termination, but this does not apply
to federal judges as most of them have tenure or life terms. (p. 52) As a result, and
unlike Baker (2008), the judges selected in this study are divided into two groups:
those that have a life term and judges that have a fixed term, at the end of which the
process of reelection takes place. (p. 52)
The authors argued that raising judicial salaries would only improve the
quality of judges if those who select judges, usually some part of the executive
branch, have good incentive, and are objective in their selections, and if they can
effectively distinguish between “good” and “bad” judges. (p. 56) The data collected
by the authors was a compilation of decisions of judges of higher courts from 1998
to 2000. (p. 50) It was pulled from higher courts because, “in each of the fifty states,
we have a set of judges doing similar tasks, but laboring under different conditions.”
(p. 64) In other words, this allowed the author to see how different input variables
may affect judicial output. Similar to Baker (2008), the data was used to examine
how higher judicial salaries, and to what extent, may affect judicial performance, in
terms of productivity, opinion quality, and independence. (p. 50)
Their productivity variable is measured in terms of published opinions; it is
based on the assumption that judge will put in significantly more time and effort
into an opinion that ends up getting published. (p. 66) Moreover, they claimed, a less
productive judge may drag out the time it takes to write an opinion leading to fewer
potential publications in a given time period, or simply write a summary disposition.
(p. 66) However, the authors argued that a state may vary in what it deems to be
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publishable, so they controlled for this by adding an alternate variable to measure
effort, the number of pages published. (p. 66)
The proxy used by the authors to measure opinion quality was the number of
citations by out-of-state, state judges, out-of-state federal judges, and references in
law reviews. (p. 66) The authors said that this is based on the assumption that a
citation is a product made for consumer and the number of citations is a reflection
of its quality. (p. 66) In addition, the authors incorporated out-of-state judges
because their citations are voluntary, while in-state-judges are normally bound by
precedent, and therefore, required to cite specific opinions. (p.67)
The proxy used for independence, which was defined as “free from the
influence of bias and partisan pressures,” used the number of opposing opinions
issued against members of the same political ideology. (p. 68) This was defined as
an opposing opinion written by a judge, or received by another judge, of the same
political ideology. (p. 68) Further, the authors normalized this variable to account
for the varying numbers of partisan judges across different circuits; some circuits
may have more republicans than democrats, and vice versa. (p. 69)
The authors prefaced their study by noting that, due to data limitations, it is
difficult to establish the correct causal story. In other words, it’s hard to discern
whether the higher wages lead to more productivity or more productivity leads to
higher wages. (p. 74) The data was drawn from high court decisions from 1998 to
2000, including data from 52 states. (Oklahoma and Texas have two high courts)
Further, “The dataset contains 408 judges, approximately 8 per court. The average
judge spent 2.65 of the 3 years in our sample period on the court. Each judge wrote
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an average of 24.9 opinions per year.” (p. 74) The data on productivity was
aggregated over a year, and independence was aggregated over the three years. (p.
75) The authors employed a cross-sectional analysis and chose to introduce a
number of state level controls rather than employing state fixed effects. (p. 76) As a
proxy for experience, which is similar to measure in this paper, the authors
subtracted the year a judge graduated from law school from the year 1998; they
expected that more experienced judges decide cases with greater skill and speed. (p.
79) In addition, the authors introduced variables for age and gender due to the fact
that at least some past literature, namely Collins and Moyer (2008) and Peresie
(2005), concluded that these variables can have an impact of judicial decisions. (p.
79)
The authors estimated that judicial salaries are only weakly correlated with
higher productivity. In fact, “for a 10,000 increase in salary, effort increased by 6.6
percent.” (p. 83) Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the authors found that
productivity is not positively correlated with job security. They concluded that
increases in tenure results in lower productivity, and is significant at the 5 percent
level. (p. 83) In other words, the less likely it is that a judge is removed from the
bench, the less productive he or she will be. Similarly, they found that for judges
with shorter the tenure, an increase in salary will have larger effect on productivity
compared to judges with longer tenure. (p. 88)
In regard to opinion quality, the authors found the correlation to be small,
but statistically significant. More specifically, they found that a “10,000 increase in
salary would lead to a 1 percent increase in the number of outside state citations per
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opinion”, which as previously mentioned, is a proxy for quality. (p. 91) Also, they
found that greater pay correlates with opinion quality with judges with long tenure
and lifetime employment, but not short tenure. (p. 94) The authors’ main takeaway
from the tests on opinion quality is this: when determining whether increased
salary will affect opinion quality, mitigating circumstances, in terms of employment
conditions, matter. (p. 96)
Lastly, in regard to independence, the authors concluded that the data did
not support the position that higher salaries lead to more independent judges. (p.
96) They found that higher salary does not have a significant effect on
independence, even with judges with different tenure agreements. (p. 99)
In conclusion, Choi, Gulatie, and Posner (2009) found that increasing salaries
is not likely to increase productivity or independence; it may have an effect on
opinion quality, but only a small one, if at all. Baker (2008) and Choi, Gulatie, and
Posner (2009) utilized similar independent variables, such as productivity and
judicial diligence, court citations as proxies, and judicial independence, and
collectively came to the conclusion that raising judicial salaries will not have a
significant impact on judicial performance.

Data Description:
The SSA offers several types of disability benefits, including Title II (covered
or insured employment) and Title XVI (covering individual with limited income or
resources). “The Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge directs a nationwide
field organization consisting of 10 regional offices, 168 hearing offices (including 6
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satellite offices), 5 national hearing centers, and 2 national case assistance
centers.”13 All of the offices are staffed with Administrative Law Judges who preside
over hearings as well appeal cases. Each year, more than 1,300 ALJs render over
700,000 decisions at the hearing level.14 If the claimant disagrees with the decision
made at the hearing, they can file an appeal, within 60 days with the Appeals
Council, which will either decide on the case or refer the claimant back to an
Administrative Law Judge for further review.15 The Appeals Council listens to over
165, 000 hearing decisions appealed by claimants each year.16 If the claimant
disagrees with the Appeal Council’s decision, he or she can file a civil suit in federal
court. The SSA then prepares all claim information to be transferred to a federal
court, in which a final decision will be rendered. The SSA processes over 16,000
cases appealed to federal courts each year.17
The data provided for each individual Administrative Law Judge includes
hearing office name, total dispositions, decisions, allowances, denials and fully
favorable or partially favorable decisions.18 The SSA also provides aggregate data on
the total amount of dispositions, decisions, allowances, denials and fully favorable or
partially favorable decisions for each regional hearing office. The award rate for an

Social Security Administration. “Information about the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review.”
14 Social Security Administration. “Information about the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review.”
15 Social Security Administration. “Information About Requesting Review of an Administrative Law
Judge's Hearing Decision.”
16 Social Security Administration. “Information About Requesting Review of an Administrative Law
Judge's Hearing Decision.”
17 Social Security Administration. “Information about the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review.”
18 Social Security Administration. “ALJ Disposition Data”
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individual ALJ will be used as the dependent variable along with total dispositions
and decisions. The total number of dispositions is the number of cases heard by that
particular judge. The number of decisions, either favorable, partially favorable, or
denial, is number of cases decided by an individual judge. The background
characteristics, which will be used as the independent variables, of judges were
obtained through Internet searches. It was not possible to obtain background data
on all the ALJs. The independent variables include, age, gender, legal experience,
tenure with the SSA, and salary.
The judge’s age is calculated by finding a judges’ age in some past year
through an Internet search and converting the age to the year in which the data for
that judge are reported. If the judge appears in multiple years in the data file, his or
her age is updated for each of those years.
The variable “gender” is inferred by looking at their names, or through
internet searches in ambiguous cases. The variable for gender is coded as “1” for
female and “0” for male. This variable will have the largest sample size among all
our independent variables and gender can be inferred for nearly all judges in the
ODAR file.
The variable “legal experience” is calculated by subtracting the year a judge
passed the bar from the year in which the judge is currently observed in the data.
Like age, this variable is updated sequentially for each year the judge appears in the
data file.
The variable “tenure” is calculated by finding the year a judge started with
the SSA through an Internet search and subtracting that from the year a judge is
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currently observed in the data. Like age and “legal experience” the variable is
updated for each year the judge appears in the data.
The variable “salary” of a judge is obtained through Asbury Park Press, which
publicly releases data on federal employees.19 The data on the website is only for
one year, so we obtain multiple years of data from multiple versions of the same
site.
It is important to note that given that the aforementioned variables are not
publicly released by the SSA, and had to be found using Internet searches, the
sample size for many of variables is relatively small. As a result, the regressions will
generally be limited to examining each variable individually as opposed to
controlling for all of them at once.

Methods:
This study utilizes two main econometric methods, which can both be
applied to the analysis of panel data, to determine whether or not background
characteristics of ALJs have an effect on dispositions, decisions and award rates.
Panel data is a data structure in which a set of individuals is observed at multiple
points in time. In this particular case, the panel data can best be characterized as
unbalanced due to the fact that there are some years in which there is no data
available for an individual ALJ. The data collected on the ALJs ranges from 2005 to
2011; accordingly, the panel data encapsulates all available information on

19

Asbury Park Press. “Federal Employees.”
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dispositions, decisions, award rates, age, gender, experience, and legal experience
from 2005 to 2011.
The first method utilized is the standard ordinary least squares regression
(OLS). Under this model, we ignore the panel structure of the data and treat
observations on the same judge as independent. As a result, if there are
characteristics other than those included in the model, that have an effect on the
dependent variable, then the coefficient estimates may be biased. In this particular
study, OLS may indeed produce biased estimates due to the fact that it is difficult to
control for multiple background traits such as the judge’s innate leniency, views on
social programs, or how cases in the office are assigned. In this study three separate
OLS regressions are run for each of the three dependent variables (dispositions,
decisions, and award rates) In each of the three equations, the four independent
variables are tested individually as well as collectively; first, gender is tested with
salary; second, gender, salary, and legal experience are tested together; third,
gender, salary, and age are tested together; fourth, gender, salary, and tenure are
tested together; fifth, gender, salary, age, and legal experience are tested together.
The estimated equations will therefore be of the following form: Yit = β0 + β1Xit + εit
where Yit is the independent variable, Xit is the vector or control variable. Note that i
indexes individual judges and t indexes time periods.
Since there are multiple years of data for each judge, one can estimate panel
data regressions by fixed effects; accordingly, the second model this study utilizes
fixed effects. This method allows one to difference out time-invariant unobserved
characteristics, which may affect dispositions, decisions, or award and be correlated
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with the independent variables. If there are constant unobserved traits correlated
with observed background traits (or independent variables) then the fixed effects
model will eliminate these unobserved traits as a potential source of bias. However,
in differencing out unobserved traits, the method prevents us from being able to
measure the effect gender, as it is constant over time. Accordingly, we estimate
separate fixed effect regressions for men and women to determine if the effect on
the independent variables varies by gender. As with the previous model, three
separate tests are run for each of the independent variables. In addition, the pairing
of independent variables tested in this model are the same as those in the OLS
model.
We had several expectations prior to testing the data. First, we expected that
the additional years of legal experience and tenure would result would cause a judge
to be less generous in granting disability benefits. This is due to the “hardening
effect” discussed in Peresie (2005). It could also could be a result of a more
experienced judge’s ability recognize false claims for disability benefits. We did not
expect to see a significant effect of salary due to the fact salaries are largely fixed
based on seniority and location. Lastly, we did not expect gender to have a
significant effect on award rates given neutrality of Social Security disability cases; it
is far more likely, as Peresie (2005) found, that gender has an effect on judicial
decision-making in gender-coded cases.
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Results:
Table 1 presents the OLS regression results for the number of dispositions by
a judge. The results in column (1) indicate that women have 43.1 fewer dispositions
per year than men, holding all other factors constant. We also see that salary has a
positive but diminishing effect on the number of dispositions that a judge makes in a
given year. The results for the year dummies indicate that dispositions were lower
in the year 2008 compared to the reference year of 2011, but there are no other
significant differences by year in these data.

Table 1. OLS Regression Results for Dispositions
(1)
(2)
(3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std.
(Std.
(Std.
Error)
Error)
Error)
Female
-43.063*** -52.135***
-88.95
(6.2199)
(8.5145)
(61.5702)

(4)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
-37.7814*
(21.98135)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
-89.256
(58.2722)

Salary

0.4430***
(0.0042)

0.0452***
(0.0061)

0.09098
(0.0779)

0.05777***
(0.01512)

0.0672061
(0.0753)

Salary
Squared

-0.1367***
(0.0148)

-0.14***
(0.0215)

-0.3012
(0.2687)

0.1867***
(0.05322)

-0.2079
(0.2603)

X

0.0019
(0.4892)

X

X

-14.919***
(3.5338)

Tenure

X

X

0.686
(1.52978)

.685993
(1.5298)

X

Age

X

X

-2.363
(2.988)

X

5.726327
(3.8799)

Legal
Experience
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Year 07

2.8421
(9.6465)

8.1024
(13.9091)

-55.9601
(132.832)

-33.0877
(37.9084)

61.13598
(131.8638)

Year 08

-31.569***
(8.7971)

-36.31***
(12.4055)

-38.8572
(121.5722)

-79.5431**
(33.2632)

45.81648
(119.1366)

Year 09

-6.0851
(8.4903)

-11.6979
(11.8664)

-8.6522
(101.7067)

-38.34096
(32.0044)

28.6903
(98.04488)

Year 10

-9.0011
(8.303377)

-7.9032
(11.714)

70.05969
(104.9109)

-40.2216
(31.33307)

95.25459
(101.493)

Constant

-3118.185
(301.6285)

-3182.8***
(434.8857)

-6149.608
(5552.716)

-3980.5***
(1061.545)

-4773.481
(5350.35)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), which adds legal experience to the model, we obtain
essentially the same results for gender, salary, and the year dummies, although the
effect of gender is slightly smaller and the linear effect of salary is much smaller.
This regression suggests that, controlling for the gender and salary of the judge,
legal experience does not have a significant effect on the number of dispositions. In
column (4), which adds tenure the model, we see similar results as (1) and (2) for
gender and salary, as well as the year dummies. In column (5), the results indicate
that, when controlling for age, salary, and gender, for every additional year of legal
experience, the number of dispositions falls by 14.92 and the result is significant.

Table 2 presents the OLS regressions results for the number of decisions by a
judge. The results in column (1) indicate that women issue 37.65 fewer decisions
per year than men, holding all other factors constant. We also see a positive, but
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diminishing, effect of salary on the number of decisions issued in a given year. The
dummy variables indicate that the number of decisions issued in 2008 and 2009
were lower in comparison to 2011.

Table 2. OLS Regression Results for Decisions
(1)
(2)
(3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std.
(Std.
(Std.
Error)
Error)
Error)
Female
-37.6446*** -44.6437***
-63.6202
(5.3072)
(7.199562)
(54.2268)

(4)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
-31.0835
(18.98004)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
-60.21848
(49.2938)

Salary

0.0374***
(0.00364)

0.03832***
(0.0052)

0.06521
(0.06861)

0.0457***
(0.01305)

0.03979
(0.06368)

Salary
Squared

-0.1162***
(0.0127)

-0.1194***
(0.0182)

-0.2115
(0.236689)

-0.14588***
(0.4595)

-0.1125
(0.2202)

Legal
Experience

X

-0.0247894
(0.4136)

X

X

-14.0844***
(2.9893)

Tenure

X

X

X

-0.5404
(1.3209)

X

Age

X

X

-2.9208
(2.6322)

X

4.3392
(3.2821)

Year 07

0.4071
(8.230932)

2.8792
(11.7616)

-21.225
(116.9887)

-18.87048
(32.7325)

90.572
(111.5464)

Year 08

-37.9804***
(7.5048)

-41.5036***
(10.48594)

-42.68961
(107.0723)

-76.0991***
(28.7214)

34.25487
(100.7803)

Year 09

-11.9673*
(7.2444)

-19.1641*
(10.0341)

17.46925
(89.57613)

-37.4582
(27.6346)

14.13398
(82.93836)
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Year 10

-4.52061
(7.0849)

-4.43155
(9.90528)

62.95583
(92.39812)

-34.08462
(27.0549)

80.82814
(85.8552)

Constant

-2617.01***
(257.3674)

-2673.14***
(367.7358)

-4375.981
(4890.443)

-3160.42***
(916.6031)

-2855.123
(4525.981)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), we obtain a slightly smaller effect for gender and a nearly
identical result for salary. The dummies, like (1), also indicate the number of
decisions were lower in the years 2008 and 2009 in relation to 2011. In Column (4),
we see a similar effect of salary as (1) and (2), as well as a decrease in decisions
issued 2008 in relation to 2011. We also see that there is no significant relationship,
holding gender and salary constant, between legal experience and the number of
decisions. However, in Column (5), when we add age to the control variables, we see
that every additional year of legal experience results in a 14.08 reduction in the
number decisions, and the result is significant at the .01 level.

Table 3 presents the OLS regression results for the award rates of a judge. In
column (1), we see no significant relationship between gender and award rate. The
results indicate that salary has a negative, but diminishing effect on award rate;
thus, higher paid judges are less generous, but at a diminishing rate.

Table 3. OLS Regression Results for Award Rates
(2)
(3)
(1)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std.
(Std.
(Std. Error)
Error)
Error)
Female
.00285
.02241***
-.0026

(4)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
.00387

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
.00496
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Salary
Salary
Squared
Legal
Experience
Tenure
Age
Year 07
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10
Constant

(.0048)
-.00003***
(3.32e-06)
.0001***
(.00001)
X

(0.0264)
-.00004
(.0000334)
.0001
(.0001)
X

(.0157734)
-.00003***
(.0000108)
.00001***
(.00004)
X

X

(.0065632)
-.00003***
(4.75e-06)
.0001***
(.00017)
.00182***
(.000377)
X

X

X

X

.1125***
(0.0074931)
.11155***
(.0068)
.09036***
(.0066)
.0556***
(.0064617)
2.9512***
(.2348)

.10699***
(.01073)
.10894***
(.00959)
.089123***
(0.00917)
.05062***
(.0090579)
2.80394***
(.33618)

-.00059
(.0012807)
.1955***
(0.0569)
.2014***
(.05209)
.1903***
(.04358)
.1277***
(0.04495)
3.3557
(2.3794)

.00066
(.0011)
X
.1345***
(.0273)
.1154***
(0.02401)
.0897***
(.0231205)
.0601***
(.0226384)
2.6767
(.76207)

(.02657)
-.0000462
(.0000343)
.0001
(.0001)
.00257
(.0016)
X
-.0033**
(.0018)
.19021***
(.0601)
.1996***
(.0543)
.1773***
(.0447)
.1132**
(.04626)
3.84788
(2.4388)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), the results show females have award rates that are two
percentage points higher than males. Column (2) the results again indicate a
negative, but diminishing effect of salary. We also see that for every additional year
of legal experience, when controlling for gender and experience, the award rate
increases by 0.0018 annually, and the result is significant at the .01 level. Column
(4) also demonstrates a negative and diminishing relationship between salary and
award rate, but has an insignificant tenure with SSA effect. In column (5), we see
that, holding gender, salary and legal experience constant, a one-year increase in age
results in a reduction of .003 in the award rate, but the result only significant at the
0.05 level.
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The results for the dummies in all columns indicates that the award rates
generally decreased from 2007 to 2011, which is perhaps in indication that the
judges, as a whole, became aware of the fact that they could not afford to maintain
such high award rates. In addition, it may also be a result of increasing media and
congressional attention on the SSSI program in general and the generosity of judges
in particular.

Summary of results for OLS:
The results for OLS indicate that legal experience results in fewer
dispositions and decisions, but higher award rates. We also see that women
generally had fewer dispositions and decisions and slightly higher award rates. Our
coefficients also suggest that salary has a positive, but diminishing effect on
dispositions and decisions; and a negative and diminishing effect on award rates. So
higher paid judges have more dispositions and decisions, at a decreasing rate, and
lower award rates, also at a decreasing rate. Lastly, it is important to note that for all
the OLS regressions there was no statistically significant relationship between
tenure and dispositions, decisions, and award rates.

Table (1) presents the fixed effects regression results for dispositions. Before
discussing the results of, it is important to note that the variable gender is omitted
from all regressions due to the fact that gender remains constant over time, and thus
is differenced out.
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Dispositions
(5)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std.
(Std.
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Error)
Error)
Female
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
Salary
.073215***
.07021***
.06759
.08483***
.070928
(-.00482)
(.00878)
(.05544)
(.0161868)
(.05673)
Salary
-.24598***
-.2328***
-.2426188
-.2892***
-.249365
Squared
(.0183)
(.0257)
(.1999)
(.06093)
(.204569)
Legal
X
16.8136***
X
X
1.92457
Experience
(6.0848)
(37.0612)
Tenure
X
X
X
32.9066*
X
(16.8231)
Age
X
X
-24.2771
X
(Omitted)
(244.886)
Year 07
-86.4901***
(Omitted)
-144.7455
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(17.66465)
(982.3369)
Year 08
-99.6869*** -45.2931***
-97.90955
-65.3842** 12.28924
(13.71711)
(9.7619)
(742.9647) (27.02668) (42.9824)
Year 09
-46.465***
-14.7686
-25.9589
-39.2199
38.5274
(9.6361)
(9.4791)
(491.2114)
(25.2472)
(49.9937)
45.3109
Year 10
-30.6927***
-17.244*
6.5703
-49.5337**
(24.9495)
(56.6725)
(7.5634)
(9.4529)
(248.8363)
Constant
-4936.46*** -5337.24***
-2402.712
-6025.8*** -4590.898
(319.0112)
(578.8374)
(17700.9)
(1149.497) (4916.574)
Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (1), the results indicate that indicate that, when controlling for all
other variables, salary has a positive, but diminishing effect on the number of
dispositions. We also see that the dummy variables for year indicate that the
number of dispositions increased from 2007 to 2010, using 2011 as the base year. In
column (2), which adds legal experience to the model, we see that salary has a
similar, though slightly smaller, effect on the number of dispositions. We also see
that, when controlling for salary, for every additional year of legal experience, the
number of decisions rises by 16.81, and the result is significant at the .01 level. This
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result contradicts what we saw with the OLS model, which is perhaps an indication
that there was some bias in the OLS model that the fixed effects model took into
account; the possible sources of bias will be addressed later in the conclusion
section of the fixed effects model. Also in column (2), we see similar effects for the
dummies variables. Column (4), which adds tenure to the model, suggests a similar
relationship between salary and the number of dispositions. The results of the
dummy variables indicate that the number of dispositions increased in 2008 and
2010 in comparison to 2011. We also see, when controlling for salary, that for every
additional year on tenure the number of dispositions increases by 32.91 annually,
but the result is only significant at the .1 level.

Table 5 presents the fixed effects regression results for decisions. In column
(1) we see, when holding all other variables constant, that salary has a positive, but
diminishing effect on the number of decisions. The dummy variables indicate that
the number of decisions increased in 2007 and 2008, but subsequently decreased
from 2008 to 2011.

Table 5. Fixed effects Regression Results for Decisions
(1)
(2)
(3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
(Std.
Error)
Female
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
Salary
.06186***
.058842***
.03444
(.00407)
(.0057106)
(.0455)
Salary
-.20912***
-.19652***
-.1225
Squared
(.01524)
(.02133)
(.1641)

(4)
(5)
Coefficient Coefficient
(Std.
(Std. Error)
Error)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
.06923***
.03776
(.01361)
(.0466)
-.2372***
-.13045
(.0512)
(.168001)

40

Legal
Experience
Tenure

X
X

16.7171***
(5.05199)
X

Age

X

X

-81.806***
(14.6662)
-100.76***
(11.3871)
-49.268***
(8.0005)
-24.032***
(6.27963)

(Omitted)

-4134.9***
(264.8642)

Year 07
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10

Constant

X

X

X

30.43336**
(14.1498)
X

-5.3954
(30.4378)
X

(Omitted)

(Omitted)

-46.7538***
(8.1006)
-20.289***
(7.8704)
-10.0966
(7.8486)

-65.8889
(201.107)
-272
(806.7243)
-228.1894
(610.145)
-132.9775
(403.3974)
-35.7002
(204.352)

(Omitted)

-71.6027***
(22.731)
-41.6572**
(21.23533)
-40.5627*
(20.98489)

-25.5482
(35.3002)
-5.7959
(41.0583)
35.1871
(45.7222)

7.8486***
(-4518.146)

2698.557
(14536.51)

-4907.94***
(966.8351)

-2105.867
(4037.837)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), which adds legal experience to the model, we see a similar,
though slightly smaller, effect of salary on the number of decisions. The dummy
variables indicate that the amount of decisions decreased in 2008 and 2009 in
relation to 2011. Our estimates also imply that, when controlling for salary, every
additional year of legal experience results in 16.72 more decisions, and the result is
significant at the .01 level. As with the result of legal experience in the model for
dispositions, this directly contradicts the results in the OLS model, suggesting some
bias in the OLS model. In column (4), which introduces tenure to the model, the
regression indicates a similar effect of salary on the number of decisions, although
the effect is slightly larger than (2). The dummy variables show that decisions
generally decreased from 2008 to 2011. It also indicates that, when controlling for
salary, every additional year of tenure results in 30.43 more decisions, and the
result is significant at the .05 level.
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Table 6 presents the fixed effects regression results for award rate. In column
(1), we see a negative, and diminishing effect of salary on award rate. The dummy
variables in this regression show that award rates generally decreased from 2007 to
2011.
Table 6. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Award Rate
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables
(Std.
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Error)
Female
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
Salary
-.00003***
-.00003***
-.00001
-.00004***
(2.95e-06)
(4.22e-06)
(.00003)
(8.72e-06)
Salary
.00009***
.000118***
.00003
.0001***
Squared
(.00001)
(.00001)
(.00001)
(.0000328)
Legal
X
-.02098***
X
X
Experience
(.00372)
Tenure
X
X
X
-.022**
(.0091)
Age
X
X
.02198
X
(.12233)
Year 07
.07061***
(Omitted)
.18923
(Omitted)
(.0106)
(.49072)
Year 08
.08193***
.03085***
.16472
.01887
(.0083)
(.00597)
(.3711)
(.0146)
Year 09
.07341***
.03542***
.14192
.03207**
(.0058)
(.0058021)
(.2454)
(.01462)
Year 10
.04406***
.01904***
.0947
.01935
(.00456)
(.01904)
(.1243053)
(.01348)
Constant
2.94927***
4.0467***
.03899
3.63845***
(.19223)
(.35504)
(8.8424)
(.6191)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
(Omitted)
-.000013
(.00003)
.00004
(.0001)
-.02798
(.01878)
X
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
.02392
(.02178)
.04359*
(.0253)
.045
(.0282)
2.8187
(2.492)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In Column (2), which introduced legal experience to the model, we see a
nearly identical effect of salary on award rate. The dummy variables in the
regression show a general decrease in the award rates from 2008 to 2010. It also
indicates that, when controlling for salary, every additional year of legal experience
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results in a reduction of .02 in the award rate. This means that for every five-year
increase in legal experience, the award rate drops by roughly 10 percent, which
gives some validity to our expectation that legal experience is negatively correlated
with award rate. In column (4), which introduces tenure, our coefficients estimate a
similar effect of salary seen in (1) and (2). Moreover, when controlling for salary, the
regression indicates that every additional year of tenure results in a .02 reduction in
the award rate. In other words, a 5-year increase in tenure results in a roughly 10
percent reduction in the award rate, which like the results for legal experience, gives
some validity to our expectation that additional years of tenure result in lower
award rates.

Summary of Fixed Effects:
The fixed effects model presents a number of significant relationships.
Firstly, we saw a general increase in the number of dispositions and decisions from
2008 to 2011, but a reduction in award rates from the same period. The ladder, as
previously mentioned, suggests that perhaps the increased media and congressional
attention given to the SSDI program caused judges to be more cautious in granting
disability benefits
The regressions show that as legal experience increased, the number of
dispositions and decisions increased, while the award rate decreased. The same
result was seen with tenure in relation to dispositions, decisions, and award rate.
The results also show that salary had a positive, but diminishing, effect on
dispositions and decisions, but a negative, and diminishing, effect on award rates. It
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is also important to note that we observed no significant effect of age on any of the
dependent variables.
As previously mentioned, the results seen with the OLS directly contradict
those seen with the fixed effects model. The OLS model shows that additional years
of legal experience result in fewer dispositions and decisions, but an increase in
award rate; the fixed effects model shows that additional years of legal experience,
and tenure result in an increase in dispositions and decisions, but a reduction in
award rate. As a result, it is likely that there is bias that distorted the results in the
OLS model, but is taken into account by the fixed effects model. One possible source
of bias is the theory that more lenient judges tend to stay on the bench longer, while
tougher judges tend to leave the bench earlier. This is based on the assumption that
more lenient judges will generally enjoy their job more than the latter, and thus stay
on the bench longer. Another possible source of bias is the idea that more
experienced judges are assigned easier cases. This could be due to the fact that more
experienced judges have more discretion in determining that cases they will preside
over or more experienced judges are simply assigned more straightforward cases.
However, this study did not seek to investigate the manner in which cases are
assigned to ALJs. Accordingly, it is difficult to know for certain whether these are
actual sources of bias; such an investigation could be included in future studies of
the topic. Nonetheless, we observe some source of bias distorting the results in the
OLS model. As a result, we conclude that the results seen in the fixed effects model
are more likely to reveal the true relationship between age, salary, legal experience,
and tenure and dispositions, decisions, and award rates.
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Since gender is omitted from the original fixed effects model, we include
separate fixed effect regression models for males and females. We incorporate two
separate regressions to see if the effects of the explanatory variables on
dispositions, decisions, and award rate differ by gender. Table 7 presents the fixed
effects regressions for dispositions for men. In column (1), the regression shows
that salary has a positive, but diminishing, effect on the number of dispositions,
holding all other factors constant. The dummy variables show that the number of
dispositions for men decreased from 2007 to 2008, but subsequently increased
from 2008 to 2011.

Table 7. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Dispositions (MEN)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coefficient
Variables
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Salary
Salary
Squared
Legal
Experience
Tenure
Age
Year 07
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10
Constant

.07496***
(.00632)
-.2557***
(.0236)
X

.006052
(.1012134)
-.0429
(.3545)
X

.09043***
(.0214)
-.31611***
(.0797)
X

X

.07041***
(.0088863)
-.23654***
(.03293)
17.87643**
(7.2968)
X

X

X

X

-95.673***
(21.114)
-97.863***
(16.298)
-38.512***
(11.231)
-23.419***
(8.9445)
-4958.94***
(413.4059)

(Omitted)

6.1004
(262.6655)
26.4975
(1066.829)
56.748
(810.1546)
104.7598
(532.9551)
84.0163
(269.7242)
129.3241
(19776.68)

42.0241**
(20.396)
X

-38.2299***
(11.3232)
-3.02163
(11.3973)
-15.2479
(11.585)
-5323.48***
(748.2153)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.
Error)
.0249
(.1097)
-.1011
(.3838)
(Omitted)
X

(Omitted)

-11.02082
(49.77857)
(Omitted)

-45.8049
(31.0919)
-16.6125
(31.0064)
-50.8239
(30.96298)
-6372.61***
(1532.304)

36.70353
(53.408)
83.74339
(63.36854)
84.14518
(74.83654)
-199.5948
(10436.47)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level
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Column (2), which introduces legal experience, reveals a nearly identical
relationship between salary and the number of dispositions. It also indicates that
every additional year of legal experience results in an increase of 17.88 dispositions
annually for men. In column (4), which incorporates tenure, the regression indicates
a similar effect of salary on dispositions as seen in (1) and (2).

Table 8 presents the fixed effect regression results for dispositions for
women. In column (1), the regression shows a positive, but diminishing, effect of
salary on the number of dispositions, holding all other factors constant. Further, the
dummy variables reveal a drop in the number of dispositions for women from 2007
to 2008, but a rise from 2008 to 2011.

Table 8. Fixed Effect Regression Results for Dispositions (WOMEN)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std Error) (Std. Error)
Salary
.06546***
.06065***
.03426
.05967**
(.0074)
(.01048)
(.05002)
(.02321)
Salary
-.2121***
-.19037***
-.1042
-.19117**
Squared
(.0283)
(.039654)
(.1883)
(.08771)
Legal
X
9.70239
X
X
Experience
(11.0511)
Tenure
X
X
X
18.398
(27.36162)
Age
X
X
5.8328
X
(44.7079)
Year 07
-69.468**
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(33.7282)
-36.0408
-158.028***
Year 08
-118.213*** -71.0767***
(19.304)
(61.8656)
(54.935)
(26.61904)
Year 09
-74.863*** -51.0096*** -102.9836 -107.2718**
(16.8407)
(62.1806)
(41.6693)
(18.9461)
Year 10
-45.9713***
-14.60639
-52.5281
15.3762

(5)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
.03426
(.05002)
-1.0419
(.18826)
(Omitted)
X
5.83284
(44.7079)
(Omitted)
-36.0408
(61.86587)
-102.9836
(62.1806)
-52.52808
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Constant

(14.0218)
-4582.10***
(487.4297)

(15.7239)
-4641.89***
(869.8347)

(61.1401)
-2658.38
(5474.895)

(38.572)
-4281.64***
(1610.253)

(61.1402)
-2658.38
(5474.895)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

Column (2), which introduced legal experience, reveals a similar relationship
between salary and the number of dispositions as (1). The dummy variables show
an increase in the number of dispositions from 2008 to 2010. Column (4), which
incorporates tenure, again shows the same effect for salary, as well signifies an
increase in the number of dispositions from 2008 to 2009.

Table 9 presents the fixed effects regression results for decisions for men. In
column (1), we see a positive, but diminishing effect of salary on the number of
decisions issued by men, holding all other factors constant. Furthermore, the
dummy variables show an increase in the number of decisions from 2009 to 2010.

Table 9. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Decisions (MEN)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Salary
.06314***
.05795***
-.0322
.0709***
(.0052)
(.00736)
(.08295)
(.017922)
Salary
-.21679***
-.19559***
.0978
-.2488***
Squared
(.0195)
(.0272796)
(.2905)
(.0669)
Legal
X
16.925***
X
X
Experience
(6.0433)
Tenure
X
X
X
36.4306**
(17.1164)
Age
X
X
-45.6004
X
(216.0898)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
-.0155
(.0900)
.04536
(.3148)
(Omitted)
Tenure
-19.1583
(40.8346)
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Year 07
Year 08

Year 09
Year 10
Constant

-90.0526***
(17.4532)
-100.6071
(13.4696)
-43.974***
(9.2829)
-17.742**
(7.393474)
-4136.15***
(341.7208)

(Omitted)

(Omitted)

(Omitted)

-41.4764***
(9.372)

-134.923
(874.3305)
-111.1147
(663.9706)

-57.4207**
(26.09245)

-14.1901
(43.8119)

-12.9113
(9.4397)
-8.7265
(9.5951)
-4419.62***
(619.701)

-38.2519
(436.7888)
23.43759
(221.0553)
6307.572
(16208.19)

-23.9821
(26.0206)
-40.4622
(25.9842)
-4990.54***
(1285.913)

19.1299
(51.1625)
64.5974
(61.3903)
(3039.281)
(8561.3)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

The regression in column (2), which introduces legal experience, also shows
a positive, but diminishing effect, of salary of the number of decisions issued by men,
although no significant conclusions can be drawn from the results for the dummy
variables. The regression indicates that every additional year of legal experience for
men, results in a 16.93 increase in the number of decisions issued, and the results
are significant at the .1 level. In column (4), the regression, which includes tenure,
shows roughly the same effect of salary on the number of decisions, but no
significant conclusions can be drawn from the dummy variables in this regression.
However, it indicates, when controlling for salary, that additional years of tenure for
men result in an increase of 36.43 decisions issued annually, and is significant at the
.05 level.

Table 10 presents the fixed effects regression results for decisions for
women. In Column (1), it is seen that salary has a positive, but diminishing, effect of
salary on the number of decisions issued by women, holding all other factors
constant. The dummy variables indicate an increase in the number of dispositions
from 2007 to 2008, but a decrease from 2008 to 2011.
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Table 10. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Decisions (WOMEN)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
Variables
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std.Error) (Std. Error)
Salary
.0558***
.0533***
.0257
.0572***
(.0063)
(.0088)
(.044)
(.02)
Salary
-.1816***
-.1702***
-.0747
-.1882**
Squared
(.0234)
(.0333)
(.1654)
(.0756)
Legal
Experience
Tenure

X
X

12.3493
(9.2925)
X

Age

X

X

-64.147**
(28.5598)
-109.202***
(22.54)

(Omitted)

-.2108
(39.2822)
(Omitted)

-65.4744***
(16.2324)

-67.4714***
(16.043)
-36.4703***
(11.873)
-3891.763
(412.738)

-43.6786***
(14.1608)
-7.0665
(13.2217)
-4130.98***
(731.412)

Year 07
Year 08

Year 09
Year 10
Constant

(5)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
.0257
(.0434)
-.0747
(.1654)

X

X

(Omitted)

X

20.9883
(23.5728)
X

X

(Omitted)

-.2018
(39.2822)
(Omitted)

-23.892
(54.3579)

-138.097***
(47.3283)

-23.8919
(54.3579)

-88.4645
(54.6344)
-44.8836
(53.7203)
-1743.543
(4810.468)

-98.9916***
(35.8992)
-17.586
(33.2306)
-4075.83***
(1387.361)

-88.4645
(54.6343)
-44.8837
(53.7201)
-1743.543
(4810.468)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), the regression, which includes legal experience, also shows a
positive, but diminishing effect of salary on the number of decisions, but no
significant effect of legal experience. It also signifies an increase in the number of
decisions issued by women from 2008 to 2009. The regression in column (4), which
includes tenure, reveals the similar results for salary and the dummy variables as
the regression in (2), but no significant effect of tenure.
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Table 11 presents the fixed effects regression results for award rates for
men. In column (1), we see a negative, but diminishing, effect of salary on award
rate. The dummies indicate an increase in award rates from 2007 to 2008, but a
decrease from 2008 to 2011.

Table 11. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Award Rates (MEN)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variables
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (StdError) (Std. Error)
Salary
-.00001***
.-.00003***
.00001
-.0004***
.00001
(3.56e-06)
(5.02e-06)
(.0005)
(.00001)
(.00006)
Salary
.0001***
.0001***
-.00006
.0001***
-.00006
Squared
(.00001)
(.00001)
(.0002)
(.00004)
(.0002)
Legal
X
-.0187***
X
X
(Omitted)
Experience
(.0041)
Tenure
X
X
X
-.0219**
X
(.0106)
Age
X
X
.0139
X
-.0205
(.1335)
(.0256)
Year 07
.0635***
(Omitted)
.1273
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(.0118)
(.5403)
Year 08
.0731***
.0254***
.1136
.0172
.0187
(.009`)
(.0064)
(.4103)
(.016)
(.0275)
Year 09
.0689***
.0339***
.1195
.0434***
.0515
(.0063)
(.0065)
(.2699)
(.0159)
(.0321)
Year 10
.0423***
.0202***
.1012
.0193
.0696*
(.005)
(.0065)
(.1365)
(.0159)
(.0385)
Constant
2.8323***
3.934***
-1.1094
3.9467***
1.298
(.2324)
(.423)
(10.0154)
(.7828)
(5.3698)
Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), which introduces legal experience, the coefficients again
reveal a negative, but diminishing, effect of salary. We also observe an increase in
award rates from 2008 to 2009, but a decrease from 2009 to 2011. The results
indicate that every additional year of legal experience results in a decrease of .0187
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in award rates annually. In column (3), we see the same effect of salary, as well as a
.0219 decrease in award rates for every additional year of tenure.

Table 12 presents the fixed effects regression results for award rates for
women. In column (1), the regression shows a negative, but diminishing, effect of
salary on award rates for women. We also see a general decrease in the award rates
from 2007 to 2011.

Table 12. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Award Rates (WOMEN)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Variables
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Error) (Std.Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Salary
-.00003***
-.0004***
-.00003
-.00002
(5.83e-06)
(8.64e-06)
(.00002)
(.00002)
Salary
.0001***
.0001***
.0001
.00007
Squared
(.00002)
(.00003)
(.0001)
(.00006)
Legal
X
-.0277***
X
X
Experience
(.0091)
Tenure
X
X
X
-.0215
(.0198)
Age
X
X
-.0339
X
(.0239)
Year 07
.0935***
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(Omitted)
(.0263)
Year 08
.1125***
.0513***
.0393
.026
(.0208)
(.0159)
(.033)
(.0397)
Year 09
.0902***
.043***
.0314
.0007
(.0147)
(.0139)
(.0332)
(.0303)
Year 10
.0509***
.0163
.0027
.0261
(.0109)
(.0129)
(.0327)
(.0279)
Constant
3.1371***
4.3422***
5.0775***
2.5521**
(.3786)
(.7175)
(2.9253)
(1.1692)

(5)
Coefficient
(Std.Error)
-.00003
(.00003)
.0001
(.0001)
(Omitted)
X
-.03394
(.0239)
(Omitted)
.0393
(.0331)
.0314
(.0332)
.0027
(.0327)
5.0775*
(2.9253)

Estimates are significant at the ***(.01), **(.05), *(.10) level

In column (2), which incorporates legal experience, we see a similar effect of
salary, as well as a decrease in award rates from 2008 to 2009. The results also
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indicate that an additional year legal experience results in a reduction of .0277 in
award rates annually, and is significant at the .01 level.

Summary of separate fixed effects rate models for men and women:
The separate fixed effects models for dispositions indicate a positive, but
diminishing effect, of salary on the number of dispositions for males and female
judges. In other words, higher paid judges, both male and female, hear more
dispositions, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, they both show a decrease in the
amount of dispositions from 2007 to 2008, and an increase in dispositions from
2008 to 2010. One notable difference between the separate models for dispositions
is that additional years of legal experience for men result in an increase in the
amount of dispositions annually, while the same was true for women but the result
was insignificant.
The separate fixed effect regression models for decisions show a positive, but
diminishing, effect of salary on the number of decisions for both men and women.
This indicates that higher paid male and female judges issue more decisions, but at a
decreasing rate. Moreover, both models show a general increase in the number of
decisions issued from 2009 to 2011. However, the number of decisions dropped
from 2007 to 2008 for women, while the results for the same time period were
insignificant for men. The regressions in the fixed effects model for men reveal that
additional years of legal experience and tenure result in more decisions, while the
effect in the regressions from women are insignificant.
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For both men and women, we see a negative, but diminishing, effect of salary
on award rates. So, higher paid judges, males and female, are less generous but at a
decreasing rate. Both models also indicate a general decrease in award rates from
2007 to 2011. Additionally, both models show a similar effect of legal experience on
award rates; every additional year of legal experience results in lower award rates.
However, the fixed effect model for males indicate that every additional year of
tenure resulted in lower award rates, but the effect of tenure is insignificant for
women.
In conclusion, we see the same effect of salary, for male and female judges, on
dispositions, decision, and award rates. However, we observe differing results with
other variables in the separate fixed effect models. In the models for men, the
coefficients indicate that additional years of legal experience and tenure result in
more dispositions and decisions, and a reduction in the award rate. In the model for
women, we see that the effect of tenure on dispositions, decisions, and award rate
are all insignificant. Similarly, the regressions for women indicate that the effect of
legal experience on dispositions and decisions are insignificant, although it is
significant for the effect on award rate, which parallel the effect seen in the model
for male judges. As a result, the data seems to suggest that more experience male
judges tend to hear more dispositions and decide more cases. This is perhaps an
indication that female judges take more time to decide their cases. This study does
not seek to provide an explanation for this phenomenon, but one potential
explanation is that female judges either receive, or perceive to receive, more
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scrutiny from other judges when deciding cases; thus, they take more time to ensure
they reach the correct result; this may be a topic for future research into the subject.

Conclusion:
The purpose of this study was to examine the decision making process of
Administrative Law Judges. In pursuit of this goal, we examined the effect of gender,
salary, legal experience, age, and tenure on the number of decisions, dispositions,
and award rates. The data, which span the years 2005-2011, were obtained from the
SSA’s Office of Disability and Adjudication Review (ODAR), along with Internet
searches to obtain information on the personal attributes of the judges. We utilized
linear regression, incorporating both ordinary least squares and fixed effects, to
determine whether the explanatory variables have an effect on dispositions,
decisions, and award rates. The fixed effect model revealed several significant
relationships. First, we observed that higher paid judges tend to hear more
dispositions and issue more decisions, but tended to be less generous in granting
disability benefits. Second, we found that additional years of legal experience and
tenure lead a judge to hear more cases and issue more decisions, but also makes a
judge less generous in granting disability benefits. However, the fixed effects model
did not allow us to draw conclusions on gender. As a result, we included separate
fixed effects models for men and women to see if the effects of the explanatory
variables on dispositions, decisions, and award rates differ by gender. Based on
these models, we conclude that more experienced male judges tend to hear more
dispositions and issue more decisions, although have similar award rates as females.
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